

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE 15 May 2000		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED MONOGRAPH	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE ORGANIZATION FOR PLANNING = THE CORPS-TO-JTF CONTINGENCY OPERATION SCENARIO				5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) LIEUTENANT COLONEL Christopher P. Gehler					
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) School of Advanced Military Studies Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) US Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027				10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT SEE ATTACHED APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.				12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)					
14. SUBJECT TERMS				15. NUMBER OF PAGES 56	
				16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UNLIMITED		

**Organization for Planning:
The Corps-to-JTF Contingency Operation Scenario**

**A MONOGRAPH
BY
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United States Army**



**SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
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FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS**

Academic Year 1999-2000

Approved for Public Release Distribution is Unlimited

20010515 067

ABSTRACT

ORGANIZING FOR PLANNING: THE CORPS-TO-JTF CONTINGENCY OPERATION SCENARIO, by LTC Christopher P. Gehler, USA, 56 pages.

This monograph examines how the corps planning organization transitions in the corps-to-JTF contingency operation scenario. The research question of the monograph is, "Should the corps form the separate planning elements of the J35, future operations, and the J5 future plans, in the corps-to-JTF contingency operation scenario." The monograph determines that the corps-based single planning organization model, as employed by the XVIII Airborne Corps, possesses the requisite competencies and efficiencies so as not to require the formation of two planning elements.

The first part of the monograph examines the corps. It examines its mission, role, and staff organization. It continues by specifically examining the corps planning organization and procedures in detail. This doctrine and SOP based review determines the planning competencies of the corps planning organization. This research determines that the critical corps planning competencies include a combined operational and tactical level planning proficiency, the ability to plan across the time and event horizon (near-term/branch and long-term/sequel), and planning joint and interagency supporting integration.

The next part of the monograph researches the JTF. It considers its mission, role, and staff organization. It continues by specifically examining the JTF's planning organization and procedures in detail. This doctrinal review determines that the JTF staff possesses the same planning competencies and capabilities of any joint staff, since joint doctrine does not differentiate between levels of joint staffs. It also determines that the JTF planning competencies include a complete operational-level planning capability, an ability to plan across the time and event horizon, and the ability to achieve unified action in planning joint, interagency, and multinational integration.

Finally, the monograph analyzes the research and evaluates it against the criteria of similarity of required competencies and staff planning effectiveness. The examination of these criteria answers the research question. The determination of this research is that the corps should not automatically form the separate planning elements of the J35 and J5.

The monograph concludes and provides two recommendations. First, joint tactics, techniques, and procedures should include an example of the single planning cell model, discussing its strengths and weaknesses. Second, the Combined Arms Directorate should reexamine and reevaluate the proposal to adopt the joint two-element planning organization for Corps XXI.

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MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

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
Title of Monograph: Organizing for Planning: The Corps-to-JTF Contingency
Operation Scenario

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Accepted this 15th day of May 2000

Chapter 1

Introduction

The commander, joint task force (CJTF) may organize the JTF headquarters as necessary to carry out all duties and responsibilities.

Joint Pub 5-00.2

But if as Van Creveld says, "the attainment of certainty is, a priori, impossible," we also may want to conclude that the grail may not be, ultimately the prize; what we are discovering in our quest may be the real prize.

*Alexander Lewis and Michael Athans
in "The Quest for a C3 Theory"¹*

Joint doctrine establishes the conceptual foundation of the United States Armed Forces' ability to fight as a joint team. These concepts are authoritative, but they are not set in stone. Joint doctrine encourages and supports discussion, debate, practice, and refinement so that joint operations become more responsive and effective.² Joint doctrine empowers joint commanders with options for how to organize and employ a joint force and headquarters. However, the joint commander retains the authority to organize his headquarters as necessary to accomplish his assigned missions, duties, and responsibilities.³

The United States calls upon its armed forces to respond to a wide variety of crises throughout the world, not just major regional conflicts. In these small scale contingencies, ranging from humanitarian assistance missions to forcible entry operations, geographic Commanders in Chief (CINC) increasingly look to service units such as an army corps, a numbered air force, or a marine expeditionary force (MEF) to become joint task forces (JTF). Without any foreseeable change to the National Security Strategy reducing the requirement to

respond to small-scale contingencies, the trend of using these units as the base organization for forming JTFs will not only continue, but will increase.⁴

The idea of using service units as the base organization for JTFs is now a well established concept. Given the force structure changes of the past 10 years since the end of the COLD WAR, corps-level service headquarters are the option of choice for CINCs in forming a JTF in contingency operation scenarios.⁵ However, the organization of a service headquarters, specifically an army corps headquarters, is different from a joint headquarters. This difference reflects the difference in mission and competencies of the organization. Despite these differences, CINCs are opting to train and use these organizations over ad hoc formations and service component headquarters.

While joint doctrine provides guidelines and options for forming a joint headquarters, the final organization is ultimately the commander's decision.⁶ The question that confronts the commander and his staff is the degree of change from the current organization to meet the requirements of the JTF to accomplish its mission. Rather than simply adopt a complete doctrinal organizational model of a JTF, the commander and his staff must determine the requirements of the mission and their implications for the JTF organization. With this knowledge, the commander makes the decision of how to change and augment his organization to accomplish the given mission as a JTF.

The research question of this monograph is: Should the corps form the separate planning elements of the J35, future operations, and the J5, future plans, in a corps-to-JTF contingency operation scenario. The hypothesis of this

monograph is that the corps should not automatically form these separate planning elements, but rather should make minor changes to the existing planning organization to accomplish the JTF mission. The final organization must be the product of careful mission analysis, adding capabilities (and size) only as necessary to accomplish its stated mission.

The scope of this monograph is limited to focusing on how the army corps transforms itself into a joint task force headquarters. Specifically, how the corps planning organizations transition to JTF planning organizations. To do so, it examines both the corps and the joint staff planning organizations in detail. It determines the planning competencies of each organization and contrasts them to determine the required changes for transformation. A basic premise in using a service headquarters as a JTF is that it will require augmentation and some modification; the level of required augmentation and the level of change from existing planning systems is at issue. This monograph does not examine other service headquarters in detail, though it does consider some of their standard operating procedures for joint organizations.

This research is limited to the planning organizations and their respective procedures. It is not an examination of the US Army Military Decision Making Process or the Joint Planning Process. The monograph examines aspects of these only as they relate to influencing the structure and procedures of the planning organizations that employ them.

To answer the research question the monograph considers two criteria. First, the monograph evaluates the similarity of required planning competencies

between the corps and the JTF. This evaluation answers the question: does the corps alternative planning organization possess sufficiently similar planning competencies as the JTF requirement? The Random House College Dictionary defines competence in this way:

Competence n. 1. The quality of being competent; adequacy. 2. Sufficiency.

Competent adj. 1. Having suitable or sufficient knowledge, experience, etc., for some purpose; properly qualified. 2. Adequate but not exceptional. 3. Having legal capacity or qualification.

This research does not examine the quality of exceptional; suitable, sufficient, and adequate are all found by examining the doctrine and SOPs of the various organizations. Next, the monograph evaluates the level of staff planning effectiveness. To determine effectiveness, the monograph answers the question: does the corps alternative planning organization provide a similar level of effectiveness as the doctrinal JTF organization? By answering these evaluation criteria questions, the monograph answers the research question.

Chapter 2 of the monograph presents the analysis of the corps. It examines how the corps is organized for planning. It determines, through examining a combination of doctrine and standard operating procedures (SOP), how the corps develops and transfers plans to current operations. The examination continues to determine the planning competencies of the corps. The main sources for this examination include FM 100-15, Corps Operations, FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, and the SOPs of the various corps.

Chapter 3 presents the analysis of the joint task force. It examines the joint staff organizations for planning. It also examines the doctrinal baseline presented for how a JTF could develop and transfer plans to current operations.

The analysis continues on to determine the JTF's planning competencies. The main sources for this examination include Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), Joint Pub 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, and The Joint Task Force Handbook Series (Commander, Chief of Staff, and J5).

Chapter 4 begins with a discussion of the corps alternative planning organization in the corps-to-JTF scenario. This discussion acknowledges that the corps must receive some augmentation to become a JTF staff. It examines a the XVIII Airborne Corps model as a corps alternative to the full JTF planning organization. This corps alternative meets the doctrinal concepts in FM 100-15 and JP 5-00.2, but maintains a single planning organization rather than adopting the JTF baseline of two. The chapter continues by examining the planning competencies of the corps, the corps alternative, and the doctrinal JTF. It evaluates the staff effectiveness of each as well. With this analysis, the monograph answers the research question.

Chapter 5 synthesizes the analysis presented. The monograph presents conclusions and final thoughts. Finally, it provides recommendations gleaned from the research.

Chapter 2

Analysis of the Corps

The corps is a critical organization in the U.S. Army and armed forces. To understand this organization better, this chapter examines the basics of the corps including mission, role, organization, and staff structure. It then focuses on the corps' planning organization responsibilities and procedures. Finally, it determines the corps' planning competencies as presented in doctrine and the standard operating procedures from the Army's four active corps: I Corps, III Corps, V Corps, and XVIII Airborne Corps. This examination determines that the corps is capable of planning and conducting operations at both the tactical and operational levels of war in response to requirements of our army and regional combatant commanders.

The Corps

The corps is the largest and highest-echelon tactical unit in the US Army.⁷ It can operate as part of a larger army force or as part of a joint force to achieve objectives set by its higher headquarters. The corps consists of combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) units. However, it is not a fixed force. It can be tailored for contingencies around the globe.⁸ It is inherently a combined arms organization that integrates other joint capabilities to achieve its objectives.

As the highest tactical echelon, the corps usually links the operational and tactical levels of war. However, the corps is also capable of operational-level operations and may link the strategic and operational levels as well.⁹ This is a

unique characteristic of the corps. It has the capability to operate at both the operational and tactical levels.

FM 100-15, Corps Operations, states that the corps plans and conducts both major operations and battles.¹⁰ According to the Army's keystone document, FM 100-5, Operations, the operational level of war is concerned with the planning and conduct of campaigns and major operations, while the tactical level of war is concerned with the planning and conduct of battles and tactical engagements.¹¹ This framework suggests the corps is capable of operating in both the operational and tactical levels of war, though not completely sovereign of either.

The capability of the corps to function at both the operational and tactical levels of war provides higher-level army and joint commanders with numerous employment options. FM 100-15 sees the corps as both capable and expandable:

A corps headquarters may function as the Army service headquarters (ARFOR) of a subordinate joint force, the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) headquarters of a JTF, or as the JTF headquarters itself. In such cases, the corps is responsible for both operational and tactical planning and operational and tactical execution of the campaign. The centerpiece of the corps' operational responsibilities is participation in the development of a supporting joint campaign plan.¹²

In this key doctrinal statement, the Army put all corps on notice that they are available and must prepare to become ARFOR, JFLCC, and JTF headquarters. Conversely, it also notified CINCs of the same. Though corps must prepare for these roles, the CINCs are responsible for the actual training of these organizations as JTF headquarters.¹³

Staff Organization

The corps headquarters is an extremely capable organization that provides the command and control interface for its various missions. It plans, directs, controls, and coordinates the corps' operations. The headquarters consists of the corps commander, the deputy corps commander, and the corps staff, including liaison elements assigned to work with the corps.¹⁴ Of particular interest here is the actual staff organization.

The corps staff is a large organization. In some cases, it may be larger than a CINC's staff.¹⁵ The staff consists of the primary coordinating staff members representing the functions of personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, civil-military operations, and signal (G1-G6).¹⁶ As well, the staff incorporates special staff members representing other critical functions within the corps such as aviation, fire support, air defense, engineering, and public affairs to name only a few. Figure 2-1 depicts a standard corps staff organization.

Besides its sheer size, FM 100-15 identifies several key aspects of the corps that distinguish it from lower level staffs. First, the corps requires increased access to multinational forces, host nation agencies, and other sister services. This necessitates a large number of liaison elements working within the corps staff. Coordination with these elements is crucial for planning across the scope of the corps' responsibilities. Second, the corps is the focal point for planning and integrating supporting joint assets into the land fight. This requires increased access to joint assets and liaison elements in the planning process. And finally, the corps must maintain a continuous planning cycle, looking far into

the future. The corps staff must see the future battlefield in order to plan in sufficient time the movement of units and resources to affect the future fight.¹⁷




Figure 2-1. The corps staff from FM 100-15, Corps Operations.¹⁸

These key distinctions of the corps staff are indicators of the staff's operational nature. FM 100-7, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations, identifies three tasks of the operational-level commander. The first is to establish joint, multinational, non-governmental organization (NGO), private voluntary organization (PVO), and interagency linkages. Second is to conduct required operational support operations. And third, is to conduct operations as directed by the CINC or JFC at the operational level.¹⁹ While the corps staff may not be optimized for these tasks across the entire spectrum of the operational level of war and may require some augmentation, the staff does possess capabilities to accomplish these tasks with its requisite liaison linkages and internal staff

organization.

The Corps Planning Organization

Planning operations is a critical role of the corps.²⁰ As stated earlier, its planning capability is a distinguishing characteristic from lower level staffs. As in other army general staffs, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, Operations, has the staff coordinating responsibility for planning operations. This includes the preparing, coordinating, authenticating, publishing, and distributing operations plans (OPLANs), operations orders (OPORDs), fragmentary orders (FRAGOs), and warning orders (WARNOs).²¹ All other staff sections contribute to this effort, but the G3 is the focal point for the corps planning effort. This planning effort takes place in the corps' main command post (CP).²²

The base organization within the G3 division for planning is the G3 plans. At the corps level, the G3 can have an Operations and a Plans directorate. This provides a Colonel as a director, responsible for each, Operations and Plans.²³ The director of plans supervises the entire planning effort across the staff. His main deputy for daily planning is the Chief of Plans. Each corps has a little different organization based on their mission, but each generally has a Lieutenant Colonel Chief of Plans with approximately four Majors as war planners and potentially another Major as an Information Operations planner.²⁴ The section also has a deployment cell that handles time phased force deployment data (TPFDD) and provides Joint Operations and Planning Execution System (JOPES) expertise. The typical plans section also has an administration cell and an exercise cell. With this section resides the G3

responsibility for planning.

The corps staff organizes into several functionally oriented, multidisciplined cells to facilitate planning and operations within the main CP. This organization enhances and speeds coordination as well as facilitates synchronization across the breadth of the CP's responsibilities. These cells consist of the headquarters, current operations, plans, fire support, deep operations, intelligence, command and control warfare, and CSS elements.²⁵ While the Chief of Staff maintains a supervisory role over all elements of the staff, the G3 provides the staff coordinating responsibility for both the current operations and plans cells. Figure 2-2 depicts these cells and their composition by staff section. Note that several cells have similar representation. For instance, the current operations, plans, and fire support cells have many of the same representatives. In some cases, this overlapping requirement can be a limiting characteristic of the staff.




Figure 2-2. The Corps Main CP, from FM 100-15, Corps Operations.²⁶

The corps plans cell has several names throughout the army including the corps plans team, battle staff, and battle management cell.²⁷ Though units call the cell by different names, they each reflect its importance as the collective brain of the organization and engine for formulating options for the commander. The team consists of a G3 chief of plans, several G3 war planners, and a planner from intelligence (G2), logistics (G4), and fires (FSE) as its nucleus. To this core, representatives from the staff form to create the corps plans team.

The corps plans team uses the military decision making process (MDMP) in FM 101-5, Staff Organizations and Operations, or a modification to that process by local SOP, to develop its plans. It trains to become a cohesive, disciplined, and functional organization and the resident experts on the planning process. Some of the corps plans team's doctrinal functions include:

- Plan future deep, close, and rear operations (sequels).
- Use intelligence products in planning future operations.
- Develop courses of action (COA) for future operations.
- Synchronizing future operations during the development of plans.
- Plan tactical movements.
- Task-organize the corps for future operations.
- Monitor the current situation for its impact on future operations.²⁸

The current operations cell maintains the doctrinal responsibility for the development of branches to the current OPLAN. This is an important doctrinal distinction, but one that corps do not follow in actual practice.

The distinction between branches and sequels and who has responsibility for developing them is a critical element to understanding the planning continuum of a military organization. From FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, come these definitions:

Branch: A contingency plan or course of action (an option built into the basic plan or course of action) for changing the mission, disposition, orientation, or direction of movement of the force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions and reactions as determined during the wargaming process.

Sequel: Major operations that follow the current major operation. Plans for these are based on the possible outcomes (victory, stalemate, or defeat) associated with the current operation.²⁹

The MDMP contained within FM 101-5, Staff Organizations and Operations, states that results of course of action analysis (the war game) results in the commander and staff "refining or modifying the COA, to include identifying branches and sequels that become on-order or be-prepared missions."³⁰ The question then for the organization is who is best prepared and equipped to develop these branches and sequels.

Doctrinally, Corps Operations, states that the current operations cell develops branches and the plans cell develops sequels to the current operation. In practice, the corps plans team develops all branches and sequels up until the plan transitions to current operations.³¹ This can even include the planning the actual branch or contingency plan (CONPLAN) after the operation has been transferred to the current operations cell, as is the case in III Corps.³²

In local practice, each of the corps maintain the planning function within one element, the corps plans team.³³ This functional division is practical and simple. It clearly places the onus for planning on one cell, rather than dividing the responsibility between two elements. It also allows the corps plans team to focus on planning operations and the current operations cell on managing and monitoring them.

Corps Planning Procedures

The procedure the corps plans team uses in producing a plan in a crisis action planning sequence is best explained as a continuous planning process guided by the corps battle rhythm.³⁴ The continuous planning cycle begins upon receipt of the mission. This begins the military decision making process defined in FM 101-5. The focus of this discussion is on the distinguishing actions of the corps plans team in the planning cycle, rather than a detailed examination of the MDMP in action. In this discussion, receipt of the mission takes place before a deployment begins. With the commander's initial guidance and an initial warning order to subordinate elements issued, the G3 Chief of Plans, as the leader of the corps plans team, assembles the plans team to begin mission analysis. In Figure 2-3, this begins at C-Day or prior with mission analysis of the current mission.³⁵




Figure 2-3. The Continuous Planning Cycle³⁶

In the course of action analysis phase of planning for the current operation, the corps plans team identifies branches and sequels that need further development. Doctrinally, at this point the plans team would prepare the order, pass the branches on to the current operations cell for further development, and then focus on the sequel as the future operation. However, in practice corps develop these branches during and after the course of action analysis phase, prior to publishing the OPORD, depending on their complexity. Some branches are fully developed during the wargame and are included as part of the commander's decision support matrix.³⁷ The result of this process is a base plan with developed contingencies held together by a decision support matrix.

In III Corps, the chief of plans assigns responsibility for the branch or CONPLAN to a G3 planner. These are prioritized based on guidance from the G3, CoS, and CG, and tracked during their development.³⁸ Depending upon the level of development, these contingencies may continue in development with a G3 planner even after current operations accepts transfer of the base plan. However, the intent is to pass a completed plan with developed branches to the current operations cell.

The transition of the plan from the planning team to current operations is usually a formal briefing. The plans team gives the current operations staff a complete operations order briefing including developed branches. If other branches are not fully developed, the branch or CONPLAN is briefed separately after development is complete. To maintain situational awareness of the plans development, the current operations cell maintains a representative in the plans

team meetings as necessary.³⁹ Upon transition of the plan to current operations, the plans team continues the planning cycle by developing the sequels, which are the future operation.

The daily planning cycle is guided by what is called the daily battle rhythm. The daily battle rhythm adds structure to the planning continuum. In essence, it is the formalization of the chief of staff's responsibility to establish, manage, and enforce the staff's planning timeline in accordance with the commander's guidance.⁴⁰ The battle rhythm is a series of scheduled meetings, briefings, and decisions that maintain the corps plans team's focus well in advance of the current operation. Though not depicted in army doctrine, a battle rhythm is present in each of the corps SOPs and joint doctrine. Figure 2-4 is a graphical depiction of the battle rhythm and its cyclical nature.




Figure 2-4. The Corps Battle Rhythm.⁴¹

This battle rhythm (Fig.2-4) depicts a mature planning cycle. The current operations cell has the current plan. The corps plans team, here the Battle Management Cell, is looking at plans 96-120 hours out. This is generally sequel or next phase development. As well, the plans team is evaluating operations between 24-72 hours for possible development of CONPLANS and target refinement. FM 100-15 states that the major focus of the planning effort at the corps is developing a concept for deep operations. The plans team's involvement in the targeting meeting and board reflects this focus. The Go/No-Go decision is a meeting that involves the current operations cell and deep operations coordination cell (DOCC) with the CG and CoS to determine if the conditions are still valid to execute the planned deep operation. This represents the final phase of the cycle, execution.

Though the battle rhythm depicts a 24-hour period, it is a process of meetings over a 3-5 day period. It is the engine of the continuous planning cycle. Important in the battle rhythm is the time that the planners actually have with the commander. The commander's time is always at a premium. The battle rhythm puts regularity into the plans team's access to the commander. Access to the commander is vital at certain points of the MDMP; the battle rhythm puts the plans team and the commander into a regular cycle of interaction.

Corps Planning Competencies

The planning continuum within which the corps staff operates is responsive to the needs and desires of the corps commander. The staff exists to assist the commander. Its size, composition, and training allow it to possess

certain competencies required by the commander to execute the missions of the corps. This research determines the major competencies of the corps planning team from doctrine and the corps SOPs.

The corps, though the largest tactical organization, is also an operational-level force capable of planning and conducting operational and tactical level actions. FM 100-15 states that the corps plans and conducts major operations and battles, making it capable in both the operational and tactical levels of war. An examination of FM 100-7's three tasks of an army operational-level commander indicates that a corps is capable of operational-level responsibilities, though not optimized for the army operational-level commander role. Its main deficiency is in the support operations task. The corps staff and support command are mainly focused on in-theater, forward support to the corps.⁴² The army operational-level commander must focus on the intertheater support piece with links to national support assets and providing support to other joint forces required by Title X. To accomplish this role, the corps requires significant augmentation. This is a main distinction between the army service component commander's (ASCC) staff working for a regional CINC and a corps staff. The operational-level planning capabilities may be similar, but their support operations focus is entirely different. However, the corps is fully capable of planning and conducting action at the operational level.

The corps' ability to maintain a robust planning cycle is also an important competency. This future time horizon capability is essential for operational-level planning. The corps plans team can plan the branches (contingency plans) and

sequels (future plans) to the current operation within its battle rhythm. From their SOPs, corps routinely plans out at least 120 hours or 5 days and into the next phase of the operation.

The corps' capability to accept robust liaison elements and therefore integrate joint supporting capabilities is another critical competency. The corps staff and corps plans team incorporates these elements as required to enhance mission planning and coordination. The corps is the main focal point for integrating joint assets into the land fight. This routine integration of external joint assets is a defining characteristic and critical competency of the corps.

This research shows that the corps has several critical competencies that affect its ability to transition to a JTF headquarters. First, the corps is clearly competent in operational-level of war planning. Second, the corps has the capability to plan both current and future plans for the organization. The key point here is the development of branches and sequels. And finally, the corps has competency in planning the integration and coordination of supporting joint assets into the concept of operations. These competencies have a direct bearing on the corps' ability to transition to a JTF headquarters.

Chapter 3

Analysis of the Joint Task Force

Maximum effort to accomplish the mission, to win decisively, demands joint action on the battlefield.

*General Colin L. Powell
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff⁴³*

Our military responds to crises around the world as a joint force. While the National Command Authority (NCA) has the geographic CINCs as a joint force headquarters monitoring the majority of the globe, it is often preferable to form a subordinate joint task force to respond to a crisis situation. This chapter examines the mission, role, organization, and staff structure of the doctrinal baseline joint task force. It then focuses on the JTF's planning organizations' responsibilities and procedures. Finally it determines the JTF's planning competencies as presented in doctrinal publications.

The Joint Task Force

A joint task force is a non-permanent, joint force constituted and designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander (CINC), subordinate unified commander, or an existing joint task force commander.⁴⁴

These authorities may establish a JTF:

...on a **geographical area** or **functional basis** when the mission has a **specific limited objective** and does **not require overall centralized control of logistics**...A JTF is **dissolved by the proper authority** when the purpose for which it was created has been achieved or when it is no longer required.⁴⁵

This statement from JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), with emphasis from the source, highlights the temporary nature of the JTF and its limited mission focus. It is not a standing or permanent organization, though

there are provisions to form semi-permanent JTFs if required.⁴⁶ However, for purposes of this examination, the JTF is a non-permanent, task organized joint force.

The CJTF may employ a host of joint forces across the functional spectrum. Depending upon the mission, he may employ air, land, sea, space and special operations forces through the range of military operations. Joint Pub 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, states that the JTF is by its nature an operational-level force, organized to achieve operational-level objectives. However, depending on the nature of the mission and the political and multinational considerations involved, the JTF may also conduct operations at the strategic or tactical levels as necessary.⁴⁷

Joint forces primarily operate at the operational-level of war. According to Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, joint forces conduct campaigns and major operations to achieve assigned objectives.⁴⁸ JP 3-0 continues by citing Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, that "JFCs (joint force commanders) synchronize the actions of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces to achieve strategic and operational objectives through integrated, joint campaigns and major operations."⁴⁹ The use of the terms of joint forces and JFCs, however, include both the CJTF and the geographic combatant commanders, the typical higher headquarters for a JTF. The relationship and division of responsibilities between the JTF and the geographic CINC's headquarters is an important factor in determining the operational-level planning requirements for the JTF.

Staff Organization

The temporary nature of the JTF presents establishing authorities with several formation options for the headquarters. The major options include using an existing JTF headquarters for the mission, an ad hoc headquarters with various contributors designed specifically for the mission, or augmentation of an existing service component headquarters, such as a corps, that transitions into a JTF headquarters.⁵⁰ Regardless of the formation option, the resultant headquarters staff must be representative of the joint force, with appropriate members in key positions from the contributing services.

Joint doctrine provides a baseline JTF headquarters organization. However, it is the Commander of the Joint Task Force's (CJTF) prerogative and responsibility to organize the JTF headquarters as necessary to carry out all assigned missions.⁵¹ Joint Pub 0-2 provides some "basic doctrine" to consider in organizing the staff. First, the CJTF may organize the staff and assign responsibilities as necessary to ensure unity of effort. Second, the staff should be balanced in numbers, rank, experience and influence of position in accordance with the composition of the overall force. And third, the overall number of personnel on the staff should be kept to the minimum consistent with the task performed.⁵² Therefore, the doctrinal baseline organization provides a combination of options available to the CJTF, though not absolutely required.

The baseline joint staff contains primary coordinating staff divisions or directorates under a chief of staff. These divisions represent the functions of personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, plans, and C4 systems (J1-J6).⁵³

Additionally, the commander has the option of forming numerous boards and centers to help carry out his mission. Figure 3-1 depicts the JTF baseline command and staff organization with recommended, as well as potential, boards and centers, as required.




Figure 3-1. Typical Joint Task Force Staff Organization (baseline).⁵⁴

The Joint Task Force Planning Organizations

Planning is a critical function for the JTF. The baseline JTF staff organization has a primary directorate, the J5, devoted to plans and policy. The purpose of this directorate from JP 0-2 is to:

assist the commander in long-range or future planning, preparation of campaign and joint operation plans, and associated estimates of the situation...When the commander does not organize a separate Plans and Policy Division, the planning functions are performed by the Operations Division.⁵⁵

This is basic joint staff doctrine applies to all joint staffs, though the CINC will

determine whether his staff or the JTF staff will conduct campaign planning. Long range or future planning is the J5's major role. If the CJTF does not form a J5, the J3, Operations, performs this function. JP 0-2 provides that the J3 has the "responsibility for direction and control of operations, beginning with planning and follow-through until specific operations are completed. In this capacity the division plans, coordinates, and integrates operations."⁵⁶ Because of this shared responsibility, doctrine further clarifies a time horizon to focus the planning efforts. The J5 conducts future plans (sequels) while the J3 has current and future operations (branches).

Both the J3 and J5 have planning cells. The baseline J3 contains subordinate cells for current operations and future operations (J35); it may also contain a plans cell if required (i.e. No J5). Doctrine also recommends a joint operations center to monitor current operations.⁵⁷ The J35 is the main planning cell in the J3. Its purpose is to receive future plans from the J5 for further refinement and development, specifically of branches.

The typical JTF J5 contains several subordinate cells to accomplish its mission. There is a plans division, responsible for supervising the development of the future plan. There may also be policy and strategy divisions as required. A deployment support and Joint Operation and Planning Execution System (JOPES) cell provides the technical support for monitoring the time phased deployment data and assisting with entering planning information into the JOPES formats. Additionally, the J5 may have supervisory responsibility for the Joint Planning Group when established.⁵⁸

To assist the CJTF in the crisis action planning process, doctrine recommends the formation of a planning element. This planning element, which has several names throughout joint commands such as operations planning group, operational planning team, and crisis action team, is referred to in doctrine as the Joint Planning Group (JPG).⁵⁹ The composition of the JPG depends upon the requirements of the mission, though for baseline purposes consider representatives from each primary and special staff section, component liaison elements, and supporting element as potential participants. Its suggested purposes are to conduct crisis action planning, be the focal point for OPORD development, perform future planning, and accomplish other tasks as directed.⁶⁰

The JPG is a scaleable organization. At its core is a cell of 10-12 planners familiar with the crisis action planning process and JOPES products. To this core, representatives from the other staff and supporting elements are added as required by the planning effort. The JTF J5 Handbook notes that the core cell is very efficient in planning time, while the full JPG provides fidelity in details.⁶¹ The leader of the JPG must balance these competing characteristics.

The CJTF defines the relationship of the staff sections to the JPG, especially to the J3 and J5. Both the J3 and J5 have potential to lead the JPG. However, there is only one Joint Planning Group within the JTF. The CJTF determines which directorate supervises the actions of the JPG.

The JTF, because of its temporary nature, may just be forming as the planning process begins. During crisis action planning (CAP), the CINC determines when to form the JTF. Typically, this occurs during the CINC's

course of action development phase of the CAP. This first step for the JTF is to form the headquarters. This may occur concurrently with the JTF's CAP process.⁶² Therefore, it is important to accomplish the formation as smoothly and quickly as possible to enhance the planning effort.

JTF Planning Procedures

Planning in the JTF begins upon notification from the CINC of a crisis situation. This may begin prior to the complete formation of the JTF headquarters. As a joint force, the JTF uses the Crisis Action Planning Process and the Joint Operations and Planning Executions System outlined in JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations. Depending on whether a deliberate plan for the crisis exists, the CINC provides guidance to his staff and the JTF on whether to develop a plan from a no-plan situation or to expand or modify an existing plan to address the situation.

The core of the JPG, consisting of the J5 planners and select staff and liaison members, begin initial planning. The CINC provides planners with joint experience and service component expertise to assist the JTF in this early planning effort. This team from the CINC is called the Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC). The role of the DJTFAC is to providing joint expertise and continuity from the CINC's planning team to "jump-start" the planning process and train JTF staff members as necessary in joint planning processes.⁶³ The DJTFAC, though not part of the JTF staff, does work for the CJTF while deployed. It may augment the JTF staff throughout the CAP or until completion of its mission, but normally no longer than thirty days.⁶⁴ Its primary

focus is on assisting the JPG with the crisis action planning process.

The directorate providing the leadership of the JPG typically provides the lead planners. Therefore, the lead planners may come from either the J35 or the J5 plans cells. Joint Pub 5-00.2 depicts J35 planners as the lead planners in one instance and the J5 as the supervisory directorate in another.⁶⁵ During the planning phases of the CAP, the J5 may lead the JPG, while during the execution phase the J35 may lead the JPG.⁶⁶ Regardless of the leadership, the JPG is the engine for the plans development and the focal point for all JTF planning.




Figure 3-2. Execution Phase Crisis Action Planning Process.⁶⁷

Once the operation transitions into the execution phase, the planning procedure becomes more compartmentalized. At this point, the J5 and J35 elements focus on their respective operational time horizons. Figure 3-2 depicts

the focus and products of each of the elements in the planning process. Doctrine recognizes that this arbitrary division of planning effort can cause problems on the staff and "intramural disputes." The CJTF's clear articulation of functions and interaction procedures of these planning groups is essential. A planning priority between branches and sequels must be established. The Chief of Staff may need to mediate between the J5 and the J35

The J5 plans, as depicted in figure 3-2, focuses on the sequels to the current operation, but does not fully develop them as plans. Rather they develop the concept of operations, draft commander's intent and any wargaming results. It provides the concept sketch, statement, and initial guidance from the CJTF for the J35 Future Operations planners to further develop. The J35 then takes the concept and further refines and develops it providing the necessary details to produce the warning order and fragmentary orders.

Within the daily battle rhythm of the JTF, the Joint Planning Group update briefing informs the commander, chief of staff, and staff principles of the progress of the planning effort.⁶⁸ This briefing begins with a current situation update by the J35/J5 to provide the commander with the frame of reference that the planners are working in during the plan development. Next, the J35 reviews the current branch plans under development. Then the J5 reviews the current sequel under development. During the briefing, the priority for the JPG planning effort is established, focusing on either branch or sequel planning. Finally, the commander is briefed on the next executable plan, whether branch or sequel. This is final briefing is a decision brief; upon approval, the plan is converted into

an order.

The key planning organizations of this baseline JTF are the J35, Future Operations, the J5, Future Plans, the DJTFAC, and the JPG. The DJTFAC is incorporated into the JPG to assist the entire initial planning effort and is an initial installment of planners fulfilling a CINC responsibility to provide augmentation as required to the JTF. The JPG is the critical mass of the planning effort. It sways with the priority to the current master of the planning effort, either the J5 or J35.

JTF Planning Competencies

Examining joint doctrine provides for certain insights into the planning competencies of a doctrinal JTF. A JTF staff is a joint staff. Though obvious, the importance of this statement is that joint doctrine does not specifically differentiate between a JTF joint staff and other joint staffs such as a geographic CINC's staff.⁶⁹ The implications of this statement are that the doctrinal JTF staff inherently presumes all of the broad responsibilities and functions of a joint staff without regard for its limited role. Essentially, doctrine provides the JTF staff all the potential competencies of the most capable joint staff.

The doctrinal JTF staff is just as capable as a CINC's staff and in many areas, more capable. Since a CINC's headquarters is a unified command, a joint force with a broad continuing mission (permanent), he task organizes his staff to meet the requirements of his theater or mission. For example, US Strategic Command has task organized his staff by combining the J3 and J4 directorates and expanding the J5 directorate with several mission specific categories.⁷⁰ Other CINCs have made similar modifications. US Southern Command has in

the past had one common director of its Operations and Plans directorates, a J3/5.⁷¹ US Joint Forces Command currently has a combined Operations and Plans directorate.⁷² All of these changes have come from an assessment of their respective mission requirements. This link between the mission and the organization's required capabilities is critical when organizing the headquarters.

Without a specific mission, the doctrinal JTF's competencies are broad. The JTF is an organization that has complete competency in planning joint operations across the span of the operational level of war. As noted earlier, the JTF is also capable of planning operations at the strategic and tactical levels as necessary. The main focus and main competency of the JTF is in planning throughout the spectrum at the operational level of war. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, notes that joint forces plan and conduct campaigns and major operations. JP 3-0, somewhat differently than FM 100-5, states that the operational level of war focuses on "the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles."⁷³ It continues that battles are a concern of both the tactical and operational levels of war. This definition highlights the complete linking of the strategic and tactical levels through operational-level design, a major task and competency of the JTF.

The operational-level nature of the JTF demands a broad planning time horizon. The JTF staff must be able to plan far into the future to link military objectives with the strategic end-states. According to JP 5-00.2, this horizon is generally at least 72 hours and beyond during the execution phase.⁷⁴ The JTF

can conduct current operations and plan future operations simultaneously. As mentioned, the doctrinal JTF divides this broad horizon among the J5, future plans, and the J35 future operations. This doctrinal division provides focus across a near-term and far-term horizon. However, with only one JPG, both planning sections are limited when not the priority effort with the JPG.

The joint planners, component liaisons, interagency, multinational, and non-governmental links on the staff provide the JTF with "unified action" competency. Unified action is "the synchronized application of all the instruments of national and multinational power and includes the actions of nonmilitary organizations as well as military forces."⁷⁵ This term has a broader connotation than just joint operations and includes political, economic, informational, as well as military power. The presence of a political advisor (POLAD) on the CJTF's personal staff and in the JPG provides valuable information that will impact on operations and assist with unified action. The Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations explains that the POLAD provides diplomatic considerations and enables informal linkages into the embassies in the Joint Area of Operations (JOA) and with the State Department. As well, they supply information regarding policy goals and objectives of the State Department relevant to the operation.⁷⁶ This advisor becomes a key element in establishing "unified action" within the JOA.

This research shows that the JTF has several critical competencies. First, the JTF is primarily an operational-level planning organization with a clear capability to link the strategic and tactical levels of war. The JTF is completely

competent in this role. It can plan both campaigns as well as major operations. It also has the ability to operate at the tactical and strategic levels if necessary. The next JTF competency is planning across a broad time horizon. Joint doctrine recognizes a current, or 24-hour horizon, a future operations horizon, focusing on a 24 to between 72 and 96 hours concerned with branch planning, and a future plans horizon of beyond the 72-96 hour period, concerned with sequel planning. The doctrinal JTF has separate organizations to focus on each area. The J35, future operations, plans branches in the interim period, and the J5, future plans section, plans the sequels associated with the long-range period. Finally, the JTF is competent in unified action. More than just integrated joint operations, this concept brings together all facets of national and multinational power. Unified action synchronizes the political, economic, informational, and military aspects of the operation to achieve strategic results. This is another major competency of the doctrinal JTF.

This chapter provides the reader with a closer look at the doctrinal JTF, its roles, staff, planning organizations, and competencies. It describes the planning procedures of the JTF staff. Also, it notes the potential distinctions between the doctrinal JTF and the mission-organized JTF. With this information, the monograph continues to examine the differences between the planning organizations and procedures of the doctrinal JTF and the corps alternative.

Chapter 4

Analysis and Assessment of Differences

In both mental and physical terms, becoming a joint task force requires adapting to a different environment. The change is one of perspective. Many commanders and staff officers find it difficult to transition from the tactical-operational environment to the operational-strategic environment.

*Joint Task Force Operations and
Training Handbook Series⁷⁷*

An unstated though presumed basic premise of transitioning a corps-level headquarters into a joint task force headquarters is that there are certain similarities that enable the corps to operate as a JTF. Both joint and army doctrine acknowledge that a service headquarters, in this case the corps, requires augmentation to complete the transition.⁷⁸ The degree of organizational change and augmentation, however, is a matter left to transitioning commanders.

The question for the commander of the transitioning force to answer is, "what parts of my staff organization are sufficiently similar to those of the JTF so as to operate effectively, within the given mission, as a joint staff with minimal change to organization or procedure." This chapter examines aspects of this question and in doing so, answers the research question of this monograph. It looks at the corps alternative planning structure using the XVIII Airborne Corps' JTF structure as its model. This model adheres to both joint and army doctrinal principles, but retains the basic planning structure of the corps. The chapter also applies the criteria of similarity of competencies and staff effectiveness to this corps-based alternative. This corps-based alternative retains the corps planning organization and procedures with appropriate augmentation. This analysis

concludes by answering the research question of this monograph.

The Corps-Based Alternative

The XVIII Airborne Corps (ABC) calls itself America's Contingency Corps.⁷⁹ Its daily interaction and planning with geographic CINCs supports this title. The corps is perhaps one of the most experienced, trained, and proficient service headquarters at becoming and operating as a JTF. With experience in real and training contingency operations such as Operations JUST CAUSE, UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, and the UNIFIED ENDEAVOR series of exercises, the corps regularly operates as a JTF. Because of the habitual nature of this mission, the corps maintains a Joint Task Force SOP detailing the transition requirements of the corps staff in becoming a JTF staff.⁸⁰

The corps bases its JTF SOP on its main focus mission and presumed JTF role, contingency response.⁸¹ Joint doctrine defines contingency as:

An emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military forces. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require plans, rapid response, and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, installations, and equipment.⁸²

A contingency operation is a military operation directed by the NCA.⁸³ Contingency and crisis are often generically interchanged, though Crisis Action Planning retains a specific meaning in JOPES. Their nature is the same: military response to a time-sensitive situation. With this focus, the XVIII ABC model begins with a somewhat limited outlook; an outlook that focuses on its contingency response mission.

Corps-based Planning Transition

Doctrine provides the guidelines for transition, but not the details. The details or "the how" of the transition come from the unit SOP and the necessary modifications the unit determines during mission analysis. FM 100-15 states, "The corps G3, plans division, with augmentation from the combatant command, forms the basis of the J5."⁸⁴ The XVIII ABC JTF model puts the Director of Plans as the J5 and the Chief of Plans, as the Deputy, J5. The rest of the G3 plans division begin to form the various cells of the J5, specifically the ground plans, force deployment, and JOPES/GCCS sections.⁸⁵

The J5, in the XVIII ABC JTF model, contains a potential nineteen subordinate sections with augmentation. These include such other sections as the intelligence plans, SOF plans, fires plans, air plans, rotary wing plans, political-military plans, amphibious plans, maritime plans, etc.⁸⁶ The J5 directorate contains all of the requisite component planners and functional expertise to produce the joint plan. This composition is similar to what joint doctrine has in both the J35 and the J5 sections; here however, they have a common leadership. The SOP also provides the J5 with the staff leadership responsibility for the Joint Planning Group.

While FM 100-15 mentions that the J3 has a section to conduct near-term planning of branches to the current operation, it does not mention its formation.⁸⁷ The XVIII ABC model acknowledges a potential J35, but does not form one automatically. Rather, the J5 is responsible for all planning, from inception to transition to current operations. This J5 model contains the requisite

planners and functionality to fully develop a plan from concept to completed order. It still prioritizes planning by branch and sequel but uses a main effort supporting effort concept to implement, without adopting a J35 section. A potential case that might require a crisis action team that looks like a J35 would include an out of sector (JOA) operation.⁸⁸

The JTF J5 model conducts planning in a similar fashion as the corps base organization. As in the corps, this model has one agency responsible for planning future operations. It also places staff leadership responsibility for the JPG, the corps planning team equivalent at the JTF, with the J5. This corresponds with the G3 plans division's role in the corps.

Criteria Evaluation

Researchers apply criteria to help maintain objectivity to their facts and evidence. Though the evidence in this research may seem apparent, the monograph applies two criteria. The two criteria applied to the corps alternative planning organization are similarity of competencies with a doctrinal JTF and staff planning effectiveness. Their analysis answers the research question

The first criterion asks, "Does the corps alternative planning organization possess sufficiently similar planning competencies as the JTF requirement?" The corps planning competencies from this research include operational-level planning capability, maintaining a robust planning cycle, and accepting liaison to assist with integrated joint planning. The planning competencies of the doctrinal JTF include planning across the span of the operational level of war, planning across a broad time horizon, and planning for unified action of all elements of

national power. The corps-based model appears to have similar competencies.

Operational-Level Planning

The XVIII ABC model J5 is a clear descendant from the corps' doctrinal base. It represents one core planning organization under the direction of the J5. It maintains all planning responsibilities, as well as leadership for the JPG. This system is very similar to that of the corps organization. The model takes component planning augmentation, liaison, and expertise, and pools them in one planning organization rather than two. The corps-based model adds to the capability of the corps planning organization with additional personnel, functional experience, operational-level planning augmentation from the CINC (DJTFAC), and a political-military advisor. Its planning capability is therefore relatively equivalent to that of the JTF doctrinal baseline.

A distinction between the model and the doctrinal baseline is the added mission reality of the model. The model assumes a CINC presence and role in a contingency operation scenario. The baseline acknowledges the possibility but does not limit the organization by it. The limitation of the model organization is the plan that the corps staff will man most of the primary staff positions of the JTF. While the history of XVIII ABC's contingency operations may bear this as valid, it is a limiting factor.⁸⁹

Another limitation is that the primary staff members, including the J5, are all O-6 level Colonels. Subordinates are likewise of lower rank and experience. This may prove limiting in campaign planning. The corps staff has little experience in campaign planning. The reference to rank implies a requisite level

of military schooling and experience. Campaign planning is a senior-level education task, usually reserved for war college students.⁹⁰ While select planners from the corps staff may be graduates of the School of Advanced Military Studies, gaining some campaign planning experience, the majority of staff members are not.⁹¹ Thus the rank structure of the corps model suggests a corresponding limit on its planning capability, while no such limit exists in the baseline JTF. However, the model JTF presupposes a subordinate role to a CINC and the limited nature of contingency operations. Doctrine purposely does not constrain the baseline JTF. Though these are differences, the similarity of requisite operational-level planning capability, especially for contingency operations, between the model and the doctrinal JTF is apparent.

Joint Integration-Unified Action

The doctrinal JTF synchronizes joint, multinational, and interagency operations. Joint doctrine terms this capability unified action. By definition, doctrine reserves this capability to unified commands, subordinate unified commands, and joint task forces. It refers to a wide scope activities within the JTF including synchronization. Unified action "integrates joint, single-service, special and supporting operations; in conjunction with interagency. Nongovernmental, private voluntary organizations, multinational, or United Nations (UN) operations into a unity of effort in the theater or joint are of operations."⁹² Though reserved for joint commands, the corps practices unified action. The XVIII ABC model JTF incorporates these capabilities with augmentation to provide it with requisite interagency and joint representation,

enhancing its planning ability. However, this is not a new capability for the corps. Its competence of integrating joint and interagency liaisons, and linking with multinational and nongovernmental organizations is a defining strength. The augmentation it receives only bolsters this capability and provides supplemental planning competence. Thus, unified action is a similar competence between the corps-based planning organization and the doctrinal JTF.

Planning Time Horizon

The doctrinal baseline JTF organizes two planning cells around a division of effort based on time and event planning focus. The corps based model maintains one planning organization responsible across the planning continuum. Both models cover the entire time horizon. Ostensibly, both organizations are proficient at planning within both the near and far term periods.

A limiting factor for both organizations is the reality of only one Joint Planning Group in the JTF. The commander sets the planning focus on either near-term (branch) or long-term (sequel) planning, dictating the JPG's focused effort. This effort automatically becomes the main planning effort. The JPG focuses on the commander's priority; not a competing demand from the J3 and J5. Though core planners can layout the basics of a plan, the JPG provides the fidelity of details. Thus, the JPG is both the collective brain and bottleneck of the planning effort.

The concept of the JPG as the critical mass of the planning effort provides insight into the overall efficiency of the planning staff, the next criterion. The baseline JTF organizational divides its planners, providing them with a clear time

horizon and task. The corps-based model maintains one organization with both time horizon and task responsibilities; in this model, the J5 has the incumbent leadership responsibility to ensure planning across both horizons and tasks. But this model also provides him access to the entire pool of planners, responding to the commander's priority of focus on a situational basis rather than an organizational one. This can create greater efficiency, but also requires active leadership.

The XVIII ABC model plans across the time horizon without organizing into time horizons. This model uses active leadership to focus the planning effort on the commander's priority and directs a supporting-effort level of focus to the non-priority horizon. In this way the J5 efficiently responds to the commander's priority, the reality of the single JPG, and the supporting-effort planning horizon.

The characteristics of historical contingency operations suggest that the XVIII ABC model possesses the required planning competencies and staff efficiency.⁹³ The relatively short-notice, short-duration, limited-scope nature does not demand an expansive planning organization, only a capable one. So long as this model is able to maintain its similarity of competencies and staff planning efficiency relative to the JTF requirement, the XVIII ABC, corps-based, single planning element model answers the research question: no, the corps does not need to form the separate planning elements of the J35, future operations, and J5, future plans, in the corps-to-JTF contingency operation scenario.

Chapter 5

Conclusions and Recommendations

...Joint operations work and they work more efficiently than single-Service operations. There is unmatched power in the synergistic capabilities of joint operations.

*General Gordon R. Sullivan
Chief of Staff, US Army⁹⁴*

Joint doctrine covers the breadth of requirements for the joint force. It is intended to provide broad guidelines and principles rather than specifics. The case of the joint staff is illustrative. A joint staff is a staff for a joint force commander, whether, a unified command or a joint task force. Each, however, has a different planning focus and horizon. Doctrine builds all joint staffs as supremely capable. The reality though is that JTF staffs are typically subordinate to unified commanders and have a limited objective and focus.

The doctrinal JTF provides a good frame of reference for transitioning commanders. It provides the options and guidelines for organizing the JTF headquarters, not a rigid and unchangeable doctrinal organization. The XVIII ABC model applies lessons learned from its contingency operations as well as joint lessons available. It routinely trains its transformation into a JTF and makes modifications as necessary. Other service organizations do the same, though no other organization examined employs a similar single planning organization model.⁹⁵ The Marine Corps has even adopted the joint two planning element system down to division and MEF level.⁹⁶ Though this may be beneficial in some situations, it should not become a doctrinal requirement.

This research determines that the corps should not automatically form the

separate planning elements of the J35 and J5 in the corps-to-JTF contingency operation scenario. Rather the commander and staff should evaluate the mission for required competencies and efficiencies and determine the best organization for the mission. In a time-constrained situation, that organization will undoubtedly be the one that the unit is most proficient and trained to operate. If the organization does not possess the required competencies, such as in a division-to-JTF scenario, the commander must modify the organization accordingly. Even the corps is not fully capable to act as a JTF without some modification and augmentation, but its competencies correspond with such similarity so as to require only augmentation to the planning organization.

Recommendations

1. Joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) should incorporate an option similar to the XVIII ABC model as an example of a modified structure, including both its strengths and weaknesses.
2. Army doctrine writers should continue to examine the potential benefits and drawbacks of realigning the corps planning staff structure with the joint doctrinal model, as now envisioned in the Corps XXI Organization and Operations Concept.⁹⁷

Endnotes

¹ Alexander H. Lewis and Michael Athans, "The Quest for a C3 Theory: Dreams or Reality," Science of Command and Control: Coping with Uncertainty, Dr. Stuart Johnson and Alexander Lewis editors, (Washington, DC: AFCEA International Press, 1988) 9.

² Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed forces of the United States, 10 January 1995, p. i. In the opening remarks of this publication, General John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, extols all commanders to understand, teach, and apply joint doctrine as they prepare and train forces to fight. A standard comment appears in joint doctrine that informs the reader that joint doctrine is authoritative. GEN Shalikashvili goes on to challenge readers to put the doctrine to work in order to fully understand and apply it.

³ Joint Pub 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, 1999, p. x. While the CJTF has guidelines in organizing, such as appropriate representatives on the staff from each service, he retains the authority to organize as he sees necessary.

⁴ The White House recently published an updated National Security Strategy (NSS) with no significant changes to the types of contingencies or interests that the US is concerned with or to which it will respond. The latest NSS is dated December 1999.

⁵ Joint Training Directorate (J7), Joint Task Force Commander: Operations and Training Handbook (First Draft), (Suffolk, Virginia: USACOM JTASC, 1999) I-2. Department of the Army, FM 100-15: Corps Operations, (Washington, DC: HQDA, 1996), 1-3. This is reflected in numerous sources used throughout this paper including joint and service doctrine as well as the training plans for United States Joint Forces Command and all army corps headquarters.

⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 13 January 1999) x.

⁷ Department of the Army, FM 100-15: Corps Operations, (Washington, DC: HQDA, 1996), 1-1.

⁸ Ibid, 2-1.

⁹ Ibid, 1-2.

¹⁰ Ibid, 1-2.

¹¹ Department of the Army, FM 100-5: Operations, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993) 1-3. Though the corps is the highest tactical echelon, Army doctrine says that the levels of war are defined more by their outcome rather than the echelon of involvement, although as a general rule, the higher the echelon, the higher the level of war (FM 100-5, 1-3).

¹² FM 100-15, 1-3. ARFOR stands for Army Forces command. It is the service component headquarters of a joint force, usually either a JTF or JFLCC. It is under the operational control (OPCON) of the joint force commander, but retains administrative control (ADCON) links to its parent service component headquarters under the CINC.

¹³ Interview with LTC Demike, Operations Officer, Operations Group Delta, Battle Command Training Program, 9 March 2000. LTC Demike recently completed a tour with USJFC where he was responsible for tracking and monitoring joint training requirements. The Army has the responsibility to train army forces to work in the joint environment, but not to be joint. The CINCs have the responsibility to actually train service forces in joint roles.

¹⁴ FM 100-15, 1-5.

¹⁵ Ronald H. Cole, Operation Just Cause: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama, (Washington, DC: The Joint History Office, CJCS, 1995) p. 14. XVIII ABC staff was twice the size (people) of the SOUTHCOM staff during Just Cause. The SOUTHCOM staff was structured primarily to conduct security assistance and military diplomacy. The operations staff was comparatively small and not suitable for the detailed planning and execution of this large contingency operation.

¹⁶ Department of the Army, Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1997) 4-9 through 18.

¹⁷ FM 100-15, 1-6.

¹⁸ Ibid, 1-6. This is figure 1-1 from the corps manual.

¹⁹ Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-7, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1995) 2-23 and 24.

²⁰ FM 100-15, 1-2. This is a constant theme throughout the manual. The corps' planning ability is a vital distinction and an inherent strength of the organization. It is a major factor in the corps' usefulness to higher-level commanders.

²¹ FM 101-5, 4-12.

²² FM 100-15, 4-8.

²³ Oral interview with Colonel William H. Groening, Director of Operations/Chief of JOC in Cynthia Hayden's, JTF-180 Oral History Interviews: Operation Uphold Democracy, (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: XVIII Airborne Corps Training Support Center, 1995) 218.

²⁴ XVIII Airborne Corps, G3 Plans Shop SOP, (Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 1998) Task Organization page (no number); also on the XVIII G3 Plans homepage on the SIPRNET.

²⁵ FM 100-15, 4-9.

²⁶ Ibid, 4-9.

²⁷ III Corps, III CORPS Plans Team SOP, (Fort Hood, Texas, 1999) 1-1. V Corps, G-3 Plans Standard Operating Procedures V 2.1, (Heidelberg, Germany, 29 April 1997) 4. XVIII Airborne Corps, G3 Plans Shop SOP, (Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 1998) 1.

²⁸ FM 100-15, B-2.

²⁹ Department of the Army, Field Manual 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1997) 1-21 and 1-139.

³⁰ FM 101-5, 5-23.

³¹ III CORPS Plans Team SOP, 5-5. V Corps, G-3 Plans Standard Operating Procedures V 2.1, 13-14. XVIII Airborne Corps, G3 Plans Shop SOP, 13.

³² III CORPS Plans Team SOP, 5-5. This is also a common practice at Division level.

³³ Reflected in the three corps SOPs used in this research and confirmed by I Corps planners as

well.

³⁴ This discussion focuses on procedures used in a non-deliberate planning environment, by joint definition, a crisis action planning sequence.

³⁵ C-Day is defined as the day a deployment operation begins (FM 101-5, H-6). This may or may not be the actual corps' deployment day, but refers to the larger mission's deployment process.

³⁶ XVIII Airborne Corps, Joint Planning SOP, (Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 1999) 2-27.

³⁷ LTC Dave Lemelin, unpublished briefing on the MDMP, 1999-2000. LTC Lemelin instructor at the Command and General Staff College teaches this technique to the Corps Planning Staff for Prairie Warrior. LTC Lemelin was recently recognized as the TRADOC Instructor of the Year, 1999.

³⁸ III CORPS Plans Team SOP, 5-6.

³⁹ Ibid, 1-1. XVIII Airborne Corps, G3 Plans Shop SOP, appendix 2, 5.

⁴⁰ FM 101-5, 4-2.

⁴¹ XVIII Airborne Corps, Joint Planning SOP, (Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 1999) 2-28.

⁴² FM 100-15, 2-23. Though the Corps Support Command (COSCOM) is capable of providing support to joint forces in the area, the distinction noted here deals with the focus of effort.

⁴³ Joint Pub 5-00.2, VII-1.

⁴⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 24 February 1995) IV-9.

⁴⁵ Ibid, IV-9.

⁴⁶ Joint Pub 5-00.2, x.

⁴⁷ Ibid, VII-13.

⁴⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1 February 1995) II-4.

⁴⁹ Ibid, II-5.

⁵⁰ Joint Pub 5-00.2, x.

⁵¹ Ibid, x

⁵² JP 0-2, IV-12.

⁵³ Ibid, IV-13. C4 systems are command, control, communications, and computers systems under the staff division of J6. This corresponds with the new army staff division G6, Signal, which also includes C4 systems.

⁵⁴ JP 5-00.2, xi.

⁵⁵ JP 0-2, IV-14, 15.

⁵⁶ Ibid, IV-14. This is a key point. Both the J3 and the J5 have responsibility for planning operations. This has the potential to cause confusion and detract from unity of effort. Close coordination between the two divisions is a pre-requisite in this situation.

⁵⁷ JP 5-00.2, VII-2.


⁵⁸ Ibid, IX-2, 3.

⁵⁹ Ibid, IX-6.

⁶⁰ Ibid, IX-7.

⁶¹ Joint Training Directorate (J7), Joint Task Force Plans and Policy (J5): Operations and Training Handbook (First Draft), (Suffolk, Virginia: USACOM JTASC, 1999) II-3.

⁶² JP 5-00.2, IX-5. The following diagram depicts when in the process the JTF HQ forms.



⁶³ Ibid, IX-7. Also reflected in USACOM, Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) Standing Operating Procedures, (Norfolk, Virginia: USACOM, 15 April 1997) 1-3.

⁶⁴ USPACOM, Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), (Honolulu, Hawaii: 1998) 1-2. USACOM, 1-3.

⁶⁵ JP 5-00.2, IX-11 and xi.

⁶⁶ Joint Training Directorate (J7), Joint Task Force Chief of Staff: Operations and Training Handbook (First Draft), (Suffolk, Virginia: USACOM JTASC, 1999) III-13.

⁶⁷ JP 5-00.2, IX-14.

⁶⁸ Joint Task Force Chief of Staff: Handbook, III-14. This process of transition of plans from J5 to J35 is governed by local SOP, as is the daily battle rhythm. No JTF SOP examined followed this doctrinal example completely.

⁶⁹ JP 0-2, IV-11. All joint staffs use the *Staff of a Joint Force* section of the UNAAF as their doctrinal baseline. This does not recognize the inherent differences between the various staffs. It is incumbent upon the Joint Force Commander to properly organize his staff for his mission, with regard for keeping its size and personnel requirements to the minimum essential level.

⁷⁰ Determined during an exercise visit to STRATCOM in April 2000. As part of a five-person planning cell, the author received briefings on STRATCOM's organization and missions. The exercise looked at a US response to a crisis between India and Pakistan.

⁷¹ USSOUTHCOM. SC Regulation, 10-3, Crisis Action Battlestaff: Standing Operating Procedures (DRAFT), (Miami, Florida: USSOUTHCOM, 26 August 1998) 2-2. This is no longer the case a SOUTHCOM. SOUTHCOM has reorganized its staff based an updated analysis of its mission into separate J3 and J5 directorates.

⁷² J3/5, Joint Forces Command Staff Points of Contact (24 April 2000); available <http://sweb1.acom.smil.mil/j3nsf/staff?openview> on SIPERNET.

⁷³ JP 3-0, II-2.

⁷⁴ JP 5-00.2, IX-3.

⁷⁵ JP 3-0, II-3

⁷⁶ Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations, (Fort Monroe, Virginia: JWFC, 1997) III-9.

⁷⁷ Joint Task Force Chief of Staff: Handbook, I-2. This statement is the authors' adaptation from this reference and the JTF Commander's Handbook. It merges the common comment found in both, applying the comment to both the commander and the staff.

⁷⁸ FM 100-15, 4-24. The establishing authority is responsible for required augmentation.

⁷⁹ Unpublished briefing, XVIII Airborne Corps Mission, approved 1 February 1999. The full mission statement is: "XVIII Airborne Corps, America's Contingency Corps, trained and resourced to deploy rapidly and achieve battle space dominance anywhere in the world, across the operational continuum, in support of national objectives."

⁸⁰ V corps maintains a JTF SOP based on USEUCOM's ED 55-11, Joint Task Force Headquarters Policies, Procedures, and Organization. The EUCOM approach is a directed core JTF structure depicting manning requirements from each component and using each component as a potential base organization. This top-down approach reflects the CINCs perspective to JTF operations rather than a Corps-based approach.

⁸¹ XVIII Airborne Corps, Joint SOP, Joint Operations Briefing Section, 3. Forming a JTF may also be in response to requirements of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, Military Support to Civil Authorities, Humanitarian Assistance, and Peace Operations.

⁸² JP 5-00.2, GL-7.

⁸³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1-02, Dictionary of Department of Defense and Military Related Terms, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 23 March 1994) 102.

⁸⁴ FM 100-15, 4-26.

⁸⁵ XVIII Airborne Corps, Joint Planning SOP, 32.

⁸⁶ Ibid, 34.

⁸⁷ FM 100-15, 4-25.

⁸⁸ Interview with LTC Michael Winstead, Chief of Plans, G3, XVIII Airborne Corps, 27 April 2000.

⁸⁹ XVIII Airborne Corps, Joint Planning SOP, 32. As reflected in the J5 manning chart.

⁹⁰ Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations homepage; <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/dmspo/dmspo.htm>; accessed 29 April 2000.

⁹¹ School of Advanced Military Studies, Syllabus, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1999) 38. This notes that campaigns are a part of the curriculum at SAMS. Only a small number of planners, typically three, on the corps staff are SAMS graduates in any given year. Other planners are optimally Command and General Staff College graduates with limited training in operational art.

⁹² JP 3-0, I-4.

⁹³ Scott Fabbri, Adam Siegel, and George Stewart, JTF Operations Since 1983, (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, July 1994) 14-15.

⁹⁴ Joint Pub 5-00.2, VII-13.

⁹⁵ Other organizational documents studied include: V Corps, JTF Standard Operating Procedures, (Frankfurt, Germany, 20 April 1996); USEUCOM, ED 55-11, Joint Task Force Headquarters Policies, Procedures, and Organization, (Stuttgart, Germany: USEUCOM, 15 January 1999); Seventh Fleet, COMSEVENTHFLT CJTF SOP, (Yokosuka, Japan, 1 October 1999); I Marine Expeditionary Force, Joint Task Force Headquarters SOP, (Camp Pendleton, California, 1998); III Marine Expeditionary Force, Joint Task Force SOP, (Okinawa, Japan, 1998).

⁹⁶ HQ, United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 5-1, Marine Corps Planning Process, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2000) C-4.

⁹⁷ Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, USACAC, Corps XXI Organization and Operations Concept (Revised Final Draft), 18 November 1998.

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